DigitalCommons@NYLS
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

7-2021

Supreme Court Unanimously Rules That Philadelphia Violated the
Free Exercise Rights of Catholic Social Services by Conditioning
Foster Care Contract on Providing Services to Married Same-Sex
Couples
Arthur S. Leonard

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs

L

G

B

T

July 2021

Supreme Court Unanimously Rules
in Favor of Catholic Social Services

L

G

B

T

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Editor-In-Chief
Arthur S. Leonard,
Robert F. Wagner Professor
of Labor and Employment Law
New York Law School
185 West Broadway
New York, NY 10013
(212) 431-2156
arthur.leonard@nyls.edu
Associate Editors
Prisoner Litigation Notes:
William J. Rold, Esq.
Civil Litigation Notes:
Wendy Bicovny, Esq.
Contributors
Ezra Cukor, Esq.
Matthew Goodwin, Esq.,
Eric Lesh, Esq.
Joseph Hayes Rochman, NYLS ‘22
Eric J. Wursthorn, Esq.
Bryan Johnson Xenitelis, Esq.
Production Manager
Leah Harper
Circulation Rate Inquiries
LeGaL Foundation
601 West 26th Street, Suite 325-20
New York, NY 10001
(212) 353-9118
info@le-gal.org
LGBT Law Notes Podcast
Listen on iTunes (search “LGBT Legal”)
or Podbean at legal.podbean.com.
Law Notes Archive
http://bit.ly/LGBTLawNotes-archive
© 2021 The LeGaL Foundation
LGBT Law Notes & the LGBT Law
Notes Podcast are Publications of
the LGBT Bar Association
Foundation of Greater New York
(lgbtbarny.org)
ISSN 8755-9021

1

Supreme Court Unanimously Rules That Philadelphia
Violated the Free Exercise Rights of Catholic Social
Services by Conditioning Foster Care Contract on
Providing Services to Married Same-Sex Couples

6

U.S. Department of Education Doubles Down on
Applying Bostock Reasoning to Title IX to Protect LGBT
Students

8

Historic Ruling in India Grants Widespread Protections
to LGBTQIA+ Community

10 9th Circuit Grants Mexican Transgender Woman’s
Convention Against Torture Claim
10 5th Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Sexual Orientation
Discrimination Claim on Exhaustion of Remedies
Grounds
12 Iowa Supreme Court Reverses Gay Workers’
Compensation Commissioner’s Jury Verdict and $1.5
Million Damage Award
14 Colorado High Court Finds Lawyer’s Punishment
for Using Anti-Gay Slur to Describe Judge to be
Constitutional
15 West Virginia’s Highest Court Rules Assistant Principal’s
Alleged Harassment of Transgender Student May
Subject School Board to Liability
16 Oregon Appeals Court Rules Against Parental Claims of
Egg Donor in Surrogacy Case
18 6th Circuit Rejects Transgender Detroit Employee’s
Hostile Environment Complaint
20 Pennsylvania U.S. District Court Allows Part of
Transgender Hospital Patient’s Suit to Survive Motion
to Dismiss
22 “Illinois Goddam”: Federal Judge Denies Summary
Judgment, Sends Shocking Case of Transgender
Prisoner Abuse to Jury
23 Four More Denials of Compassionate Release for
COVID-19 Risks; National Statistics Reported

Cover Photograph by Mark Wilson / Getty
If you are interested in becoming a
contributing author to LGBT Law
Notes, please contact info@le-gal.org.

25 Notes

47 Citations

Supreme Court Unanimously Rules That Philadelphia
Violated the Free Exercise Rights of Catholic Social
Services by Conditioning Foster Care Contract on
Providing Services to Married Same-Sex Couples
By Arthur S. Leonard
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
ruled in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,
2021 WL 245923, 2021 U.S. LEXIS
3121 (June 17, 2021), that the City of
Philadelphia violated the 1st Amendment
Free Exercise of Religion by Catholic
Social Services (CSS), a non-profit
agency affiliated with the Archdiocese
of Philadelphia, when the City ceased
referring children in need of foster care
to CSS and refused to renew the agency’s
foster care contract because CSS
refused on religious grounds to evaluate
and certify married same-sex couples to
be prospective foster parents. The Court
found determinative that the city had
no compelling justification to require
CSS to abide by the non-discrimination
provision in its contract with the City,
when the contract reserved to the City
sole discretion to allow exceptions to
the non-discrimination policy, and
there were at least twenty other foster
care agencies in Philadelphia that were
willing to evaluate and certify same-sex
couples for foster placements.
Chief Justice John R. Roberts, Jr.,
wrote the opinion for the Court, which
was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer,
Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kegan, Brett
Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.
Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion
concurring in the judgement, which was
joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and
Neil Gorsuch. Justices Alito and Thomas
also joined an opinion concurring in the
judgment by Justice Gorsuch. Justice
Barrett filed a concurring opinion,
joined in full by Justice Kavanaugh, and
in part by Justice Breyer. Because Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion was joined
by five of the justices, it is a “majority
opinion” for the Court in terms of its
analysis and holding.
All nine justices agreed that the City’s
failure to allow an exception was subject
to “strict scrutiny,” and that the City had

failed to provide compelling reasons for
its actions that were sufficient to support
the rulings by the 3rd Circuit and the
district court, which had rejected CSS’s
motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
Six members of the Court got to this
result by finding that its precedent of
Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990), did not apply to this
case; three joined the judgment but not
the Court’s opinion, finding that Smith
should be overruled, and strict scrutiny
applied under pre-Smith Free Exercise
precedents.
Although the ultimate result – a
ruling in favor of CSS – was not
unexpected among Supreme Court
watchers and commentators in light
of both the oral arguments and the
Court’s trend in favor of an expansive
view of the Free Exercise Clause, it was
notable and surprising to many that the
six-member majority opinion spanned
the ideological spectrum to include
the Court’s remaining Democratic
appointees, the conservative Chief
Justice, and two of President Donald J.
Trump’s conservative appointees, and
that the three justices who were eager
to use this case as a vehicle to overrule
the Court’s three decades’ precedent of
Smith, were unable to secure the votes
of Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett,
who are both strong advocates of free
exercise of religion.
Under Smith, government laws or
actions that are neutral with respect to
religion and have general applicability
are, assuming they serve a rational
purpose, generally immune from
attack under the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the
Court in Smith reversed four decades
of Free Exercise precedents, under
which laws incidentally burdening free
exercise of religion were subjected to
strict scrutiny. Four justices concurred

in the judgment in Smith but wrote
separately to disavow the Court’s
overruling of existing Free Exercise
precedents. Congress sought to overrule
the decision with its first enactment of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). When the Court subsequently
ruled that Congress was without power
to override its constitutional rulings,
Congress passed a narrower version of
RFRA under which individuals could
raise a free exercise defense to attempts
by the federal government to enforce
general federal laws that incidentally
burdened their religious practices,
putting the government to the burden
of showing a compelling justification
for the challenged law. Many states
passed similar laws, and the Court itself
subsequently ruled that laws otherwise
sheltered under Smith could be attacked
under the Free Exercise Clause where
the religious objectors showed that
the challenged law had been passed
specifically to impair religious freedom.
Chief Justice Roberts assembled his
majority of six justices by finding a
way to rule for CSS without overruling
Smith. In order to get there, he found
that the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance
(FPO) did not apply to this case – thus
eliminating a legal authority that would
fall within the range of Smith’s “neutral
laws of general applicability” – and that
the action being challenged at this point
by CSS – the City’s insistence that CSS
had to agree not to discriminate against
same-sex couples – reduced the question
at issue to why the City’s Commissioner
of Human Services did not exercise the
sole discretion reserved to her under the
City’s form contract to grant an exception
to CSS from complying with the nondiscrimination requirement. Because
of the discretionary exception clause
in the contract, Roberts concluded, the
case did not involve a rule of “general
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applicability,” thus rendering Smith
irrelevant and subjecting the City’s
action to the “strictest scrutiny,” as
described in dicta in the Smith opinion
for challenged laws that either were not
neutral with respect to religion or were
not of general applicability.
In recounting the history of this
case, Chief Justice Roberts reported
that the Catholic Church in Philadelphia
has been providing services to “needy
children” since 1798, when a yellow
fever epidemic prompted a priest to start
an organization to “care for orphans”
whose parents were felled by the
disease. During the 19th century, “nuns
ran asylums for orphaned and destitute
youth.” During the 20th century, the
Church established a Children’s Bureau
to “place children in foster homes.” CSS,
licensed as a foster-care agency by the
State of Pennsylvania, has had a series of
contracts with the City dating back half a
century to evaluate and certify adults as
qualified, under standards prescribed by
a state statute, to be foster parents. The
City compensates CSS for performing
this service. When the Department of
Human Services has a child in need
of foster placement, it sends a request
to the various agencies with which it
contracts, the agencies then “report
whether any of their certified families
are available,” and the Department then
“places the child with what it regards as
the most suitable family.” The agency
then provides supportive services
during the foster placement. The City’s
compensation to the agency is a major
source of revenue for CSS.
As a Catholic agency, CSS has
long had a policy of placing children
with single foster parents or married
couples, but not with unmarried couples
regardless of whether they are samesex or different-sex. CSS maintains
that because Catholic doctrine does
not recognize marriages of samesex couples, same-sex couples are
not qualified to be certified as foster
parents even though now they can
legally marry under state law. And, of
course, Catholic doctrine disapproves
unmarried cohabitation. According to
CSS’s allegations in this case, “no samesex couple has ever sought certification
from CSS,” and if CSS is approached
2 LGBT Law Notes July 2021

by a same-sex couple, CSS would refer
them to a nearby agency that would
provide those services that CSS could
not provide consistent with Catholic
Church doctrine. There are at least
twenty such agencies in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area. CSS is presently the
only such agency that refuses to evaluate
and certify same-sex couples.
This became an issue after the
Supreme Court ruled in 2015 in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015), that same-sex couples
have a right to marry under the 14th
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. After Obergefell,
controversies arose around the country
when Catholic and some Protestant
adoption and foster care agencies
indicated they would not provide their
services to married same-sex couples
and encountered opposition from state
and local governments that maintained
non-discrimination policies covering
sexual orientation. Reporters for the
Philadelphia Inquirer investigating the
issue locally determined that only two
agencies in the city, CSS and Bethany
Christian Services, would not evaluate
and certify same-sex couples. After
the newspaper reported this finding
in 2018, the Philadelphia City Council
passed a resolution calling on the City’s
civil rights agency to investigate, and
the Department of Human Services
contacted Bethany and CSS seeking
a resolution to the issue. Bethany
capitulated to the City’s pressure, but
CSS stood firm, upon which DHS
stopped referring children to CSS for
foster placement and allowed its annual
contract with the agency to lapse.
This lawsuit was begun by some
individuals who were foster parents
through CSS and the Archdiocese of
Philadelphia, represented by Alliance
Defending Freedom (which we have
sometimes referred to as “Alliance
Defending Freedom to Discriminate
Against LGBTQ People,” since that
appears to be one of the central missions
of the organization). They filed suit in
the U.S. District Court of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that
the City’s action violated both the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses
of the 1st Amendment, and seeking

preliminary injunctive relief to require
the City to resume referring children
and compensating CSS for evaluating
and certifying prospective foster
parents while the case was pending.
Among other things, CSS argued that
it was not a “public accommodation”
within the meaning of the City’s Fair
Practices Ordinance (which bans
sexual
orientation
discrimination
expressly), and that the City’s action
was subject to strict scrutiny under the
1st Amendment, so CSS was likely to
prevail on the merits as required to get
preliminary relief. (Pennsylvania’s state
anti-discrimination law does not include
“sexual orientation” as a prohibited
ground of discrimination, and this
case arose years before the Supreme
Court’s Bostock ruling of 2020, after
which many state agencies and courts
have found that their sex discrimination
laws will now cover sexual orientation
claims.)
The District Court found that the
Ordinance did cover this situation, and
that as the Ordinance was a neutral
law of general applicability under
Smith, CSS was unlikely to prevail on
its constitutional claim and was thus
not entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief. CSS appealed this ruling to the
3rd Circuit, which affirmed the District
Court as to both issues – coverage under
the City statute and applicability of
Smith. In its cert petition, in addition to
asking the Supreme Court to reverse on
the two 1st Amendment theories, CSS
asked the Court to “revisit” its decision
in Smith, as several of the justices had
indicated in past cases that the Court
should do. The Court granted cert on all
three questions: free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech, and whether Smith
should be “revisited (a euphemism for
“overruled”).
If Smith remains valid as a precedent
and is applicable to this case, the denial
of preliminary relief by the district court
would be correct, if one assumes that
the City’s reliance on the FPO brought
this case within the sphere of a “neutral
rule of general applicability.” However,
overruling Smith in this case would be
quite problematic, as Justice Barrett
pointed out in her concurring opinion,
raising a host of questions and likely

stimulating a barrage of litigation to
settle those questions. The way to avoid
this problem, as Roberts explained,
was to find that Smith does not apply
to this case, which the Court could
do by narrowing down the question
presented through its interpretation of
the City ordinance and the language of
the standard contract the City used to
contract with foster care agencies.
In Smith, Roberts explained, the
Court said that a “law is not generally
applicable if it ‘invite[s]’ the government
to consider the particular reasons
for a person’s conduct by providing
‘a mechanism for individualized
exemptions.’” In addition, he wrote, a
“law also lacks general applicability
if it prohibits religious conduct while
permitting secular conduct that
undermines the government’s asserted
interests in a similar way.” Thus, if an
ordinance does not embody an acrossthe-board rule without exceptions
or exemptions, it does not constitute
a “generally applicable” rule. As to
the FPO, the solution was to find that
CSS, as it has consistently argued
throughout the litigation, is not a “public
accommodation.” CSS also argued
that “the ordinance cannot qualify
as generally applicable because the
City allows exceptions to it for secular
reasons despite denying one for CSS’s
religious exercise. But that constitutional
issue arises only if the ordinance applies
to CSS in the first place,” wrote Roberts.
“We conclude that it does not because
foster care agencies do not act as
public accommodations in performing
certifications.”
He reached this result by a close
reading of the definition of a public
accommodation in the ordinance. A
public accommodation is an entity
“which solicits or accepts the patronage
or trade of the public or whose
goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations are
extended, offered, sold, or otherwise
made available to the public.” Roberts
insisted, “Certification is not ‘made
available to the public’ in the usual sense
of the words.” Turning to the concrete
examples of covered businesses in
the similar Pennsylvania state antidiscrimination law – hotels, restaurants,

drug
stores,
swimming
pools,
barbershops and public conveyances
– he wrote that “the ‘common theme’
is that a public accommodation must
‘provide a benefit to the general public
allowing individual members of the
general public to avail themselves of
that benefit if they so desire,” citing a
Pennsylvania intermediate appellate
decision construing the state law,
Blizzard v. Floyd, 149 Pa. Commw.
503, 506, 613 A.2d 619, 621 (1992).
(Why the state law should be deemed
relevant, when it did not forbid sexual
orientation discrimination at the time
the case arose, is not explained by
Roberts, as Justice Gorsuch notes in
his concurring opinion.) But, Roberts
wrote, “Certification as a foster parent,
by contrast, is not readily accessible
to the public,” since it requires a
“customized and selective assessment
that bears little resemblance to staying
in a hotel, eating at a restaurant, or riding
a bus.” After describing the evaluation
process in detail, he wrote, “All of
this confirms that the one-size-fits-all
public accommodations model is a poor
match for the foster care system.” He
asserted that the district court had not
taken account of “the uniquely selective
nature of the certification process” in
reaching its conclusion, agreeing with
CSS’s position that the ordinance does
not apply to this function. And, he
found, it was therefore not necessary
to examine CSS’s alternative argument
that the ordinance did not establish a
generally applicable rule since the City
did allow exceptions to its requirements
for various secular reasons.
Of more immediate moment,
however, was how Roberts chose to
characterize the question before the
Court once the ordinance was deemed
inapplicable. Now the focus was on
the contractual anti-discrimination
clause that the City insisted CSS must
sign if the City was to resume referring
children and honoring (and paying for)
CSS’s certifications of foster parents
and families. Section 3.21 of the
contract, titled Rejection of Referral,
states: “Provider shall not reject a child
or family including, but not limited to, .
. . prospective foster or adoptive parents,
for Services based upon . . . their sexual

orientation . . . unless an exception
is granted by the Commissioner or
the Commissioner’s designee, in his/
her sole discretion.” This, found the
Court, “incorporates a system of
individual exemptions, made available
in this case at the ‘sole discretion’ of the
Commissioner. The City has made clear
that the Commissioner ‘has no intention
of granting an exception’ to CSS.”
But, since a system of discretionary
exceptions means, as described in
Smith, that this is not a rule of “general
applicability,” Smith does not apply
to the question whether the City’s
refusal to grant an exception violates
CSS’s right to free exercise of religion
in conducting its mission. CSS did
allege in its complaint that the City has
allowed departures from the categorical
anti-discrimination
provision
by
allowing agencies, for example, to
take account of factors such as race
in suggesting qualifications for foster
families for particular children, but
Roberts asserted that it did not matter
whether the City had ever allowed an
exception, so long as it had reserved
the right to do so in its contract with
CSS. And, the Court deemed irrelevant
a general non-discrimination provision
elsewhere in the contract which did not
have discretionary exception language,
holding that the more specific nondiscrimination provision concerning
placement of foster children with its
discretionary exception language took
priority.
The City attempted to argue that it
was entitled to a relatively free hand
when “setting rules for contractors
when regulating the general public,”
and that individuals “accept certain
restrictions on their freedom as part of
the deal” when they contract to perform
a function on behalf of the government.
The Court was not buying this argument,
noting that the City’s brief in this case
“rightly acknowledges, ‘principles of
neutrality and general applicability
still constrain the government in its
capacity as manager.’” And, Roberts
observed, “We have never suggested
that the government may discriminate
against religion when acting in its
managerial role. And Smith itself drew
support from cases involving internal
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government affairs . . . No matter the
level of deference we extend to the
City, the inclusion of a formal system
of entirely discretionary exceptions in
section 3.21 renders the contractual
non-discrimination requirement not
generally applicable.” The Court also
rejected the City’s argument that a more
general anti-discrimination provision
elsewhere in the contract, which does
not have the exception language, is the
only relevant provision, finding that
the language of Section 3.21 sweeps
“more broadly” than the limited scope
suggested by its title, “Rejection of
Referral,” as it expressly applies to
rejection of “prospective foster parents.”
Having found that Smith doesn’t
apply to this case, the Court turned to
its traditional Free Exercise analysis,
finding that the City’s action must be
examined “under the strictest scrutiny
regardless of Smith,” and that there was
no need to consider whether to modify
or overrule Smith as a result, thus
dashing the hopes of Alito, Gorsuch and
Thomas, as expressed in the concurring
opinions by Alito and Gorsuch.
The City put forth three “compelling
interests” that it claimed were served
by the non-discrimination provision:
“maximizing the number of foster
parents, protecting the City from
liability, and ensuring equal treatment
of prospective foster parents and foster
children.” Roberts criticizes these
as being stated at too high a level of
generality for a strict scrutiny analysis,
stating that the question “is not whether
the city has a compelling interest
in enforcing its non-discrimination
policies generally, but whether it
has such an interest in denying an
exemption to CSS,” and that “once
properly narrowed, the City’s asserted
interests are insufficient.” He argued
that including CSS in the foster care
program “seems likely to increase,
not reduce, the number of available
foster parents,” and that it was only
“speculation” that the City “might be
sued over CSS’s certification practices.”
“That leaves the interest of the City
in the equal treatment of prospective
foster parents and foster children,”
wrote Roberts. “We do not doubt that
this interest is a weighty one, for ‘our
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society has come to the recognition that
gay persons and gay couples cannot be
treated as social outcasts or as inferior
in dignity and worth,’” quoting from
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). “On the facts of
this case, however, this interest cannot
justify denying CSS an exception for
its religious exercise,” he wrote. “The
creation of a system of exceptions under
the contract undermines the City’s
contention that its non-discrimination
policies can brook no departures. The
City offers no compelling reason why
it has a particular interest in denying an
exception to CSS while making them
available to others.”
Left unspoken in the opinion but
discussed during the oral argument and
alluded to in concurring opinions, was
the fact that there are numerous other
foster care agencies in Philadelphia
that would readily provide the service
of evaluating and certifying samesex couples to be foster parents. That
could undermine the argument that
the City has a compelling reason not
to grant an exception to CSS, other
than the City’s more general objection
to spending taxpayer money to pay
for a service that is discriminatorily
denied to some of its citizens because
of their sexual orientation. As to that,
there is the continuing question, never
mentioned by the Court, of whether
expending taxpayer funds in support
of a religious organization that relies
on religious doctrine to discriminate
against members of the public offends
the Establishment Clause. The Supreme
Court majority as currently constituted
has slight regard for the Establishment
Clause, the originalists among them no
doubt construing it to have the limited
meaning that states may not have
established churches directly supported
out of public revenues, because that is
arguably what people thought it meant
in 1791, having been liberated through
independence from the established
Church of England. At the time of
independence, there were established
churches in some of the states, and
because the Bill of Rights as adopted
in 1791 was binding only on the federal

government, some states continued for a
time to have established churches. The
fear that the 1st Amendment addressed,
it can be argued, was that Congress
would attempt to establish a church
for the nation that would be funded by
the federal government and that would
supplant the established state churches
under the Supremacy Clause.
“CSS seeks only an accommodation
that will allow it to continue serving the
children of Philadelphia in a manner
consistent with its religious beliefs,”
concluded Roberts; “it does not seek
to impose those beliefs on anyone else.
The refusal of Philadelphia to contract
with CSS for the provision of foster care
services unless it agrees to certify samesex couples as foster parents cannot
survive strict scrutiny and violates the
First Amendment.”
Because the Court had resolved the
appeal in favor of CSS under the Free
Exercise clause, he wrote, “we need not
consider whether they also violate the
Free Speech Clause.” The Court reversed
the 3rd Circuit’s decision affirming the
district court’s denial of preliminary
injunctive relief and remanded the case
“for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.” What that means is not
elucidated further. Since this case came
up to the Court without a record on the
merits as an interlocutory appeal from
a denial of a preliminary injunction,
there needs to be further litigation to
determine the relevant facts, unless
the City decides to settle the case by
resuming its contractual relationship
with CSS without insisting that it
comply with the non-discrimination
policy, presumably by the Commissioner
exercising discretion to make an
exception for CSS. One anticipates that
then it would also be approached by
Bethany Social Services for permission
to resume that agencies policy regarding
same-sex couples, and perhaps as well
by other agencies seeking similar
permission. Of course, as Alito and
Gorsuch suggest in their concurrences,
the City might just revise its contract
to remove the discretionary exception
language, or amend the FPO to expressly
bring social service agencies within the
definition of public accommodations, to
bring the case back within the ambit of

Smith. That would presumably support
the City’s refusal to contract with CSS
under the Smith precedent, and the case
would make its way up the appellate
ladder once again, giving the Court a
new vehicle to “revisit” Smith if four
justices were persuaded to do so.
Justice Barrett’s brief concurrence
devotes its first paragraph to casting
doubt on the validity of Smith, but then
poses the question of what would “replace
Smith” in the Court’s jurisprudence,
posing a series of questions about how
to apply the Free Exercise Clause in
Smith’s absence. She was concerned,
for example, with whether a one-sizefits-all strict scrutiny approach would be
appropriate, regardless of the severity of
the burden imposed on free exercise in
a particular case. “We need not wrestle
with these questions in this case,” she
wrote, “because the same standard
applies regardless of whether Smith stays
or goes.” Accepting Roberts’ conclusion
that the discretionary exception feature
of the contract takes this case outside
the general applicability standard of
Smith, she noted, this becomes a strict
scrutiny case, so there is no need in
this case to reconsider Smith. Justice
Kavanaugh concurred with all of this,
while Justice Breyer did not join the first
paragraph casting doubt on Smith, while
joining the rest.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
was 15 pages long. Justice Alito’s
concurrence ran on for 77 pages,
excoriating Smith, pointing out the
problems of line-drawing it creates and
hypothesizing numerous cases where
Smith would shield the government
from challenges to potentially severe
burdens imposed on individual religious
freedom. Alito’s lengthy opinion, which
delves deep into the history leading to
the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause
and the jurisprudence developed under
it leading eventually to Smith, reads
as if it was drafted to be a majority
opinion justifying overruling Smith.
But Alito could not recruit a majority
to go along, and he was contemptuous
of the opinion endorsed by the majority
evading the question. One suspects that
few other than ardent Free Exercise
proponents will struggle through Alito’s
extended discourse, although it will

provide fodder for litigants in future
cases seeking to persuade the Court to
overrule Smith.
“This decision might as well be
written on the dissolving paper sold in
magic shops,” Alito wrote of Roberts’
opinion, pointing out that by rewriting its
contract to eliminate the discretionary
exception feature, Philadelphia could
bring the case back within the ambit
of Smith. “If it does that, then, voila,
today’s decision will vanish – and the
parties will be back where they started,”
litigating this all over again. “The City
will claim that it is protected by Smith;
CSS will argue that Smith should be
overruled; the lower courts, bound by
Smith, will reject that argument; and
CSS will file a new petition in this
Court challenging Smith. What is the
point of going around in this circle?” he
asked. “After receiving more than 2,500
pages of briefing and after more than a
half-year of post-argument cogitation,
the Court has emitted a wisp of a
decision that leaves religious liberty in
a confused and vulnerable state. Those
who count on this Court to stand up for
the First Amendment have every right to
be disappointed – as am I.”
By contrast, in a little more than
ten pages Justice Gorsuch eviscerated
the Court’s explanation of how this
case was not subject to the precedent
of Smith, contending that Roberts’
method of dealing with the FPO was
inappropriate, probably wrong, and
something the Court should not have
been doing, since the court ordinarily
defers to district courts’ interpretations
of state and local laws. Furthermore,
he disparages how Roberts reconciles
the two antidiscrimination provisions
in the contract, asking why the Court
is engaging in the common law task of
contract interpretation, and he points
out that the extended analysis in which
Roberts engaged was not argued in
the parties’ briefs or in the hearing,
but seems to have been invented by
the majority solely for the purpose of
escaping Smith and thus not having to
confront the precedent head-on. “Given
all the maneuvering,” he wrote, “it’s
hard not to wonder if the majority is so
anxious to say nothing about Smith’s
fate that it is willing to say pretty much

anything about municipal law and the
parties’ briefs. One way or another, the
majority seems determined to declare
there is no ‘need’ or ‘reason’ to revisit
Smith today. But tell that to CSS. Its
litigation has already lasted years – and
today’s (ir)resolution promises more
of the same. Had we followed the path
Justice Alito outlines – holding the
City’s rules cannot avoid strict scrutiny
even if they qualify as neutral and
generally applicable – this case would
end today. Instead, the majority’s course
guarantees that this litigation is only
getting started. As the final arbiter of state
law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
can effectively overrule the majority’s
reading of the Commonwealth’s public
accommodations law. The City can
revise its FPO to make even plainer
still that its law does encompass foster
services. Or with a flick of a pen,
municipal lawyers can rewrite the City’s
contract to close the Sec. 3.21 loophole.
Once any of that happens, CSS will find
itself back where it started.”
Gorsuch concludes enumerating the
many costs to the system, the parties,
and society in general in not resolving
the problem of Smith in this case. “Smith
committed a constitutional error,” he
wrote. “Only we can fix it. Dodging the
question today guarantees it will recur
tomorrow. These cases will keep coming
until the Court musters the fortitude
to supply an answer. Respectfully, it
should have done so today.”
The Court’s action in this case
immediately brings to mind its action in
Masterpiece Cakeshop. In both cases,
the Court sought to avoid having to
decide whether to abandon the principle
of Smith and to open up any government
action or policy that incidentally
burdens somebody’s free exercise of
religion to strict scrutiny attack under
the 1st Amendment. In both cases, the
Court found an “off-ramp” by which
it could rule in favor of the Petitioner
without having to overrule Smith. In
so doing, the Court sent mixed signals
to the lower federal courts and the bar,
reinforcing the general view that the
Court will strain to find a way to rule
in favor of individual Free Exercise
petitioners without formally abandoning
Smith and doing what Congress sought
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to achieve with its first iteration of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
return Free Exercise law to where it was
before Smith was decided.
The Court had another opportunity
to address the question next term, in
Arlene’s Flowers v. State of Washington,
No. 19-333 (petition filed 9/11/2019).
The day after the Court announced its
decision in Fulton, Alliance Defending
Freedom filed a Supplement to its cert
petition (which had not been listed for
discussion at the Court’s conferences
in more than a year, according to the
Court’s docket listings), renewing its
call for a grant of cert and quoting
from the concurring opinions in Fulton.
The Supplement asserted a 4-2 split in
lower federal and state courts about
how to deal with the clash between
anti-discrimination laws and First
Amendment freedom of expression
or religious exercise claims, as well
as a split over whether the “hostility
to religion” holding in Masterpiece
Cakeshop applies only to adjudicatory
bodies, or as well the to elected officials
and prosecutors in making decisions
whether to proceed on discrimination
claims. But the Court did not take the
bait, announcing on July 2 that it was
denying the petition, with only Alito,
Thomas and Gorsuch indicating they
would have granted it (no surprise
there).
Alliance
Defending
Freedom
represented the Petitioners in Fulton,
with Lori H. Windham arguing at
the telephonic hearing. The Trump
Administration argued in support of
CSS as an amicus, with Hashim M.
Mooppan appearing from the Solicitor
General’s Office. Neal K. Katyal and
Jeffrey L. Fisher argued for Respondents,
Fisher for the City of Philadelphia and
Katyal for the Intervenor organizations
– Support Center for Child Advocates
and Philadelphia Family Pride – who
defended the City’s action to terminate
CSS’s participation in the foster care
system in the district and circuit courts.
The ACLU was also listed as a counsel
of record for the Intervenors. ■
Arthur S. Leonard is the Robert F.
Wagner Prof. of Labor and Employment
Law at New York Law School.
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U.S. Department of Education Doubles
Down on Applying Bostock Reasoning
to Title IX to Protect LGBT Students
By Arthur S. Leonard
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
issued an Executive Order on January
20, 2020 (Inauguration Day), directing
that Executive Branch agencies should
apply the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140
S. Ct. 1731 (2020), to interpret statutes
forbidding discrimination because of
sex to cover claims of discrimination
because of sexual orientation or
gender identity “so long as the laws
do not contain sufficient indications
to the contrary.” The EO specifically
referenced Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 as one such law.
The president followed up with an EO
on March 8 specifically concerning
equality in education, again referencing
Title IX, and a March 26 Memorandum
issued by the Civil Rights Division of
the Department of Justice reiterated its
view that Title IX should be interpreted
to ban discrimination based on sexual
orientation or gender identity.
The Office of Civil Rights of the
U.S. Department of Education (OCR)
announced on June 16 that it was
sending a “Notice of Interpretation”
to the Federal Register for publication
formally confirming that Title IX,
which prohibits educational institutions
that receive federal funding from
discriminating against students “on the
basis of sex,” applies to discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender
identity (transgender status).
This announcement came just a
year and a day after the Supreme
Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
employment discrimination “because of
sex,” to include discrimination because
of sexual orientation or transgender
status, in Bostock. In that case, the
Court combined appeals from the
2nd, 6th and 11th Circuit Courts of
Appeals involving two gay men and a
transgender woman alleging wrongful
discharge under Title VII and voted

6-3 that any discrimination against an
employee because they are gay, lesbian
or transgender is necessarily at least
in part because of their sex and thus
covered by the statute. President Donald
J. Trump’s first appointee to the Court,
Justice Neil Gorsuch, wrote the opinion
by assignment from Chief Justice John
Roberts, who joined the opinion together
with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia
Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch premised
his ruling on a textual interpretation of
the language of Title VII, focusing on
the ordinary meaning that would attach
to the words and phrases of the statute
when it was enacted in 1964, and found
that the result was “clear.”
Although the Bostock decision
directly interpreted only Title VII, its
reasoning clearly applied to any law
that prohibits discrimination “because
of sex” or “on the basis of sex,” as
the Education Department’s Acting
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights,
Suzanne B. Goldberg, explained in the
Notice issued on June 16.
“After reviewing the text of Title IX
and Federal courts’ interpretation of Title
IX,” wrote Goldberg, “the Department
has concluded that the same clarity [that
the Supreme Court found under Title
VII] exists for Title IX. That is, Title IX
prohibits recipients of Federal financial
assistance from discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity in
their education programs and activities.
The Department has also concluded for
the reasons described in this Notice that,
to the extent other interpretations may
exist, this is the best interpretation of the
statute.”
The Notice listed “numerous” lower
federal court decisions that were issued
over the past year taking this position,
including the most recent ruling by the
4th Circuit Court of Appeals in Grimm
v. Gloucester County School Board,
972 F. 3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020), rehearing

